introduction
In financial management context, the most important role of managers is owners' wealth maximization. However, the pattern of owners' wealth maximization is challenged by that of managers' wealth maximization. This conflict, explained proficiently by agency theory, implies that managers try to maximize their profits not necessarily in alignment and consistent with owners profits. During the last 4 centuries, many efforts have been devoted to finding an appropriate solution to align interests and incentives of owner (principal) and agent. The outcome of these efforts has been converged on audit (Ahmadpoor and Montazeri, 2011).
Moreover, some other issues including the lack of direct access to information by users, intensify the need to audit services. In fact, the role of audit is to measure the quality of information communicated to users. An external audit plays a role in corporate governance by providing an independent assessment of the accuracy and fairness with which financial statements represent the results of operations, financial position and cash flows in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Consequently, it may improve accuracy of financial information and diminish information asymmetry and agency costs arising from conflict of interests among corporate managers, stockholders and creditors (Alavi Tabari et al., 2012) .
The agency relationship is a contract in which one or more owners appoint another person as an agent or a representative on behalf of themselves and delegate decision making authorities to that party. The formation of agency relationship is accompanied by conflicting interests that originate from separation of ownership from management, different objectives and information asymmetry between managers and stockholders. According to agency theory literature, it is necessary to establish appropriate control procedures in organization in order to reduce agency conflicts. Thus, the structure of corporate governance as a solution to reduce conflicts and costs arising from formation of agency relationship must be taken into account.
Corporate governance entails processes which facilitate the creation of shareholder value through management of the corporate affairs in such a way that ensures the protection of the individual and collective interest of all the stakeholders (Hasan and Butt, 2009 ).
One of the corporate governance mechanisms are through institutional ownership which may influence monitoring costs, audits fees and executives compensation. This paper especially treats this issue among different industries. Mitra et al. (2007) indicated that Institutional and noninstitutional stockholders may have different abilities to monitor and influence firm management due to differences in the analytical and information processing resources at their disposal. Among other researchers, McConnell and Servaes (1990) reasoned that the effect of their monitoring on a firm's inherent risk or the effect of their demand for high-quality audit coverage may lead to differential relationships between the institutional stock ownership and audit fees. Moreover, the institutional investors, on average, are better informed than individual investors regarding firm financial position due to their large-scale development and analysis of timely and valuable firm-specific information. In addition, institutional investors are controllers more active to meet individual investors' responsibilities, leading to decline in agency costs. Mitra et al. (2007) demonstrated that large institutional shareholders actively monitor corporate affairs including the financial reporting process and reduce the probability of material misstatements in reported financial numbers. In such an environment, audit risk becomes lower, leading to a low ex ante risk premium and/or the lower level of audit engagement efforts and thus lower audit fees. When institutional investors hold more voting right, they would have incentives to acquire high quality information through high quality audit. Finally, the results of their study revealed that firms are more likely to attract institutional investors rather than high-quality auditors, leading to an increase in audit fees. In fact, we expect a positive relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees so that an increase in institutional percentage ownership would result in the more audit fees (Ben Ali and Lesage, 2013).
Institutional ownership and audit fees

Institutional ownership and executive compensation
Growth and expansion of economic activities and development of corporations lead to the raise of special investors and shareholders not directly participating in managing their institution as before. In order to ensure their interests, this sort of stockholders necessarily delegates the task of managing and controlling firm's resources and assets to professional and competent managers. Managers, in turn, exert all of their abilities only on the premise that they obtain benefits compensating their efforts (Lari Semnani and Jafarizad, 2010). Based on the agency theory assumptions, there are some potential conflicts between shareholders and managers interests so that managers seeking for their interests through shareholders may have some conflicts with shareholders. Generally, management bonus is deemed to be the main solution to agency problem. According to this belief, in the event of establishing proper plans for management compensation, managers are more likely to do the best in alignment with stockholders and creditors interests. The main reason for propounding bonus schemes is the necessity of compensating organizational responsibilities committed by management and stimulating mangers toward better performance. Fama believes that managers as a part of labor market are paid based on individual and organizational performance and the market regulates their performance. Therefore, in the event of bonus inappropriateness to performance, one who receives less than his perceived performance would resign from work. Because of implementing bonus plans, managers are encouraged to ensure stockholders interests. Otherwise, the perceived value of firm and its manager could decrease (Modarres, 1994 ).
Literature review
Ben Ali and Lesage (2013) examined the relationship between the audit pricing and the nature of controlling shareholders in France during a 7-year period. The results indicated that there is a significantly positive correlation between institutional shareholding and audit fees and a negative one between governmental shareholding and audit fees, but no significant relationship between audit fees and family shareholding.
Rahman Khan et al. (2011) studied the impact of firm ownership concentration on audit fees in an emerging economy, Bangladesh. They observed a significantly negative relationship between ownership concentration and audit fees implying that companies actually pay lower audit fees when these are dominated by sponsor and institutional shareholders.
Ahmad and Mustapha (2011) using data from 235 Malaysia stock exchange-listed firms investigated relationship between management shareholding and agency theory. The results revealed a negative relationship between management shareholding and monitoring cost and a positive one between institutional ownership and monitoring cost. There is also a significant relationship between institutional ownership with bonus and audit fees as they reported. Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) utilizing data from 160 German firms over the period of 1987 to 2003 analyzed the relationship between ownership structure and executive compensation. The findings suggest that executive compensation is a substantial fraction of corporate earnings and it reflects the existence of agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control. They also found that lack of control by ownership enables management to extract higher executive compensation. Finally, the link between performance and compensation is dramatically weaker in firms where ultimate owners increase their voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights.
Hartzell and Starks (2003) examined the relationship between executive compensation and institutional investment among New York stock exchange-listed firms over the period from 1995 to 2000. They depicted that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities and performance. Coles et al. (2001) surveyed the impact of some variables including executive compensation, board composition, firm's leadership and -ownership structure on market performance and risk-adjusted accounting performance over a 7-year period after controlling for the effects of some factors involving firm size, and industry performance. The results uncovered that industry performance is an influential factor on firm performance and it is better to consider this variable in studies in order to improve findings robustness.
Research method
Since the objective of the current research is to discover potential relationships between some variables, i.e. between institutional ownership on the one hand and audit fees, executive compensation and monitoring cost on the other hand, the research method is of descriptive methods from correlation analysis type. This research is practical with respect to its objectives, because we are searching for finding some solutions to existent problems. In order to test hypotheses, the multivariate regression has been used and a regression model developed to test each hypothesis.
Considering the foregoing objective of this research, the following hypotheses have been developed: H1: There is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and monitoring cost. H1a: There is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and audit fees. H1b: There is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and executive compensation.
Research models
In this research, in order to test each hypothesis, one model is used as follows: Model 1. To test the main hypothesis (H1):
Research variables
Independent variable
INST: represents institutional ownership as proxy by percentage investment of large investors such as banks, insurance companies, investment companies, funds and so forth.
Dependent variables MONITOR:
represents monitoring costs as the sum of audit fees and executive compensation EXTCOST: represents audit fees as proxy by the contractual amount paid each year to audit firm or organization for auditing services.
NEDREMM: represents executive compensation as the amount of bonus paid to managers.
Control variables
In this research, we control for the effects of some variables as follows: RECINV: represents the sum of inventories and receivables divided by total assets SIZE: represents the size of the firm and is equal to natural logarithm of total assets. DEBT: represents financial leverage as the ratio of liabilities to total assets RISK: a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm has a loss for current year, 0 otherwise. ROA: represents return on assets calculated as division of net income by total assets. GROWTH: represents the growth of firm as the difference between sale of current year and prior year divided by the sale of prior year. 
Sample
The statistic sample is initially composed of all Tehran stock exchange-listed firms. However, the systematic sampling method is used to select the qualified firms based on some required circumstances including availability of required data, conformity of fiscal year with calendar year, being audited by audit firms, and so forth. Finally, a sample of 84 qualified firms has been investigated over the period of 2006 to 2012. 
Results
Main hypothesis test
In order to choose one of panel data or cross-sectional data, the F-Limer statistic is used. As it is illustrated in table 4, the significance level of variables institutional ownership, inventory ratio, firm size, financial leverage and firm growth are less than 0.05. Then the null hypotheses for this sort of variables are contradicted implying that there are significant relationships between these variables and monitoring cost. However, the significance level of variables loss and return on assets exceed 0.05. Then the null hypotheses regarding these variables are validated suggesting that there is no any significant relationship between these variables and monitoring cost and we expect these two variables to be excluded from the model.
The details related to the coefficient of determinant, the adjusted coefficient of determinant and Durbin-Watson test run to examine lack of correlation between the model variables are presented in table 5. As it is demonstrated in table 5, the amount and significance level of F statistic suggest that the null hypothesis regarding insignificance of entire model is contradicted and the estimated regression model is valid. The results obtained from extracting the model coefficients are displayed in table 6. As it can be observed, the T statistic for institutional ownership variable is 3.626 and furthermore its significance level is less than 0.05. Then, institutional ownership is significantly and positively associated to monitoring cost and the regression model is estimated as: 
Second hypothesis test
In order to choose one of panel data or cross-sectional data, the F-Limer statistic is used. As it is illustrated in table 8, the significance level of variables institutional ownership, inventory ratio, firm size, financial leverage and firm growth are less than 0.05. Then the null hypotheses for this sort of variables are contradicted implying that there are significant relationships between these variables and audit fees. However, the significance level of variables loss and return on assets exceed 0.05. Then the null hypotheses regarding these variables are validated suggesting that there is no any significant relationship between these variables and audit fees and we expect these two variables to be excluded from the model. The details related to the coefficient of determinant, the adjusted coefficient of determinant and DurbinWatson test run to examine lack of correlation between the model variables are presented in table 9. The results obtained from extracting the model coefficients are displayed in table 10. As it can be observed, the T statistic for institutional ownership variable is 2.428 and furthermore its significance level is less than 0.05. Then, institutional ownership is significantly and positively associated to audit fees and the regression model is estimated as: EXTCOSTit = 0/833 + 1/55E+16 INSTit + 0/271 RECINVit + 0/281 SIZEit -0/102 DEBTit+ 0/0117 GROWTHit + εit
Third hypothesis test
In order to choose one of panel data or cross-sectional data, the F-Limer statistic is used. As it is illustrated in table 12, the significance level of variables institutional ownership, inventory ratio, financial leverage and firm growth are less than 0.05. Then the null hypotheses for this sort of variables are contradicted implying that there are significant relationships between these variables and executive compensation. However, the significance level of variables firm size, loss and return on assets exceed 0.05. Then the null hypotheses regarding these variables are validated suggesting that there is no any significant relationship between these variables and executive compensation and we expect these two variables to be excluded from the model.
The details related to the coefficient of determinant, the adjusted coefficient of determinant and Durbin-Watson test run to examine lack of correlation between the model variables are presented in table 13 . similarly concluded that the more the institutional owners, the more the audit fees because firms are more likely to attract institutional investors rather than high-quality auditors, leading to an increase in audit fees.
The findings attained through analysis of the third hypothesis reveal that there is a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and executive compensation. The main reason for propounding bonus schemes is the necessity of compensating organizational responsibilities committed by management and stimulating mangers toward better performance. Fama believes that managers as a part of labor market are paid based on individual and organizational performance and the market regulates their performance. Therefore, in the event of bonus inappropriateness to performance, one who receives less than his perceived performance would resign from work. Because of implementing bonus plans, managers are encouraged to ensure stockholders interests. Otherwise, the perceived value of firm and its manager could decrease. Because both of institutional owners and executive compensation cause improvement in firm performance, it can be inferred that institutional ownership is positively related to executive compensation. These results are consistent with Ahmad 
